Daily Options Report

Having a Kardashian on your arm has become the new rabbit's foot. Or something like that. Worked for Lamar Odom, and now Reggie Bush. Rumor has it crazed Cubs fan are setting up Kourtney with Carlos Zambrano as we speak.

Well, we've been big supporters of NFL coaches actually heeding the numbers and getting more aggressive on 4th down and using the onsides kick more often. Could it get better than seeing a coach willing to go that route in the Super Bowl?

Will it now go mainstream? If it does, then we've got some Game Theory issues to resolve. Onsides kicks make less sense if they're semi-expected. More on that later though, because perhaps it was more interesting how the Saints 4th down gamble played out.

To refresh, there's 2 minutes left, Saints have 4th and goal on about the 1.5. They're down 10-3. They go and fail. But it was a no-brainer decision if you really think about it. If they kick the FG, they're down 10-6, but give the Colts nearly 2 minutes and 2 minutes and the ball on probably their own 30. There's a very reasonable probability the Colts get at least a FG out of that, meaning the Saints gain nothing. If the Saints fail on 4th, they at worst pin the Colts deep and make it very unlikely that they'll turn that field position into any points. If the Saints fail and hold the Colts on downs (as they did), they get the ball back in good position to get in FG range (as they did).

Throw it all together, and there was relatively low risk in forgoing the almost certain 3 compared with large reward of a possible TD and a fallback of still having a good chance at 3.

Announcers NEVER highlight the whole field position aspect of these choices. The Colts on the 30 have a good shot at 3, the Colts on their own 2 just want to get to the locker room.

But that's just me, AdvancedNFLStats runs the actual numbers, and here's what he spit out.

According to the expected points model, it's clear that a team should go for it on 4th down and goal from anywhere inside the 6. But with time running out in the 2nd quarter, it might be better to turn to Win Probability (WP). With just under 2 minutes to go and a 4th and goal on the 1, the WP analysis agrees with the go-for-it call. FGs are successful 99% of the time, and overall, a decision to kick makes the score 10-6, giving the Saints a 0.32 WP. A successful TD ties the game, giving the Saints a 0.48 WP. A failed attempt gives the Colts a 1st down at their own 1 with 1:55 to play in the half, giving the Saints a 0.26 WP. It was a certainly a high-stakes play.

On the goal line, 4th and 1s are converted 68% of the time. This makes the overall decision to go for it worth:

0.68 * 0.48 + (1-0.68) * 0.26 = 0.41 WP

Going for the TD was clearly the better call, 0.41 vs. 0.32 WP. If you don't buy the 68% success rate, the break-even rate, where going for it yields an equal WP as the FG, would be 42%. In other words, as long as Sean Payton believed his offense had a better than a 42% chance of getting the TD, he should go for it.

In fact, this is a great example of why going for it is often worth more than many people, including most NFL coaches, believe. Pinning the Colts at their own 1 is not such a bad thing. The Saints were able to get the stop, and get the FG before halftime anyway. There's no guarantee that would happen, but combined with the possibility of a TD, it tilts the scales in favor of being aggressive.

An added bonus was Payton's great clock management after they failed on 4th. He did not call time after the Colts 1st play, as most coaches would have. Why's that right? Because you don't know you're getting a 3 and out just yet. If the Colts get a 1st, they now have the ball on, say, their own 20 and probably use a timeout of their own, leaving them about 1:40 and 2 timeouts and now they're in offense mode.

Most of the attention is going to the onsides kick, but working the end game in the 1st half well certainly helped. And that's despite failing on 4th down.

And the onsides kick? As per AdvancedNFLStats very minimal can in Win Expectancy going in, about a 2% increase. So more of a pure gamble. That being said though, stats can't gauge the momentum shift of that unique slice of time. The Saints clearly rode the mojo of that one play into a quick TD drive. That's the reward. Would the risk of missing tilted the mood so far the other way? Impossible to know.

But here's the issue with onsides kicks. They are successful over 60% of the time when unexpected, and 20% of the time when expected. The expected gain is positive when you try one in most situations. But if teams start trying them too often, the receiving teams will do more to offset it, like maybe putting an extra man up close, or putting guys with better hands in for better blockers. Those moves will reduce the odds of the kicking team recovering the onsides kick, but also move back the average field position of the receiving team on a regular kick, making onsides kicks a less attractive "surprise" option.

Yada yada yada, "surprise" onsides kicks are pretty much going to remain a move based on intuition.

• 
• Email
• Print